I decided not to blog or tweet on the chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal at the height of the events, as I do not consider myself an expert in military strategy or international relations in a broader sense. However, economics
and social sciences, more generally, have something to say about the failure of state-building in Afghanistan. For the past two decades, there has been the illusion that with the right amount of money and the right strategies, the necessary institutions for
economic and political development of Afghanistan could be built. And on the technical level, this might have had some successes, e.g., in central banking or pockets in public administration. But the building of broader institutions, such as democratic checks
and balances, broad access to public administration and a functioning and accountable enforcement framework seems to have failed. Most importantly, the occupying forces turned a blind eye to the
widespread corruption among the governing elite. So, while many in Washington DC held out hope that eventually there would be a self-sustainable democratic regime in Afghanistan, some observers were not surprised at all by its failure, as this article
from 2017 shows.