Financial Stability

The financial stability net has drawn renewed interest after the Global Financial Crisis, especially the cross-border dimension.  In addition to research work, I am actively involved in the policy debate both in Europe and in Africa. Please also note my different blog columns on the topic of cross-border bank supervision and, especially, on the banking union in Europe on Vox.

Bank Resolution Regimes and Systemic Risk (joint with Deyan Radev and Isabel Schnabel)

The Economics of Supranational Bank Supervision (joint with Consuelo Silva Buston and Wolf Wagner)

The Architecture of Supervision, with Miguel Ampudia, Andreas Beyer, Jean-Edouard Colliard, Agnese Leonello, Angela Maddaloni, and David Marques-Ibanez, ECB Discussion Paper, 2019

Sharing the Pain? Credit Supply and Real Effects of Bank Bail-ins, with Samuel da-Rocha-Lopes and Andre Silva, Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.

Supranational Supervision - How Much and for Whom?, with Wolf Wagner, International Journal of Central Banking 12, 221-68, 2016.

A Conference on Housing, Stability and the Macroeconomy: International Perspectives,  with Rabah Arezki, Robert deYoung, John Duca, Prakash Loungani, and Anthony Murphy, Journal of Money, Banking and Credit 47, S1, 2015.

A Conference on Post-Crisis Banking, with Jakob de Haan and Robert DeYoung, Journal of Money, Banking and Credit, 46 S1, 2014.

Financial Intermediaries in Monetary Policy Transmission, with Andrea Colciago and Damjan Pfajfar, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 43 (1), 2014.

Finance, Growth, and Stability: Lessons from the CrisisJournal of Financial Stability 10, 2014. 

Supervising Cross-Border Banks: Theory, Evidence and Policy, with Radomir Todorov and Wolf Wagner. Economic Policy 73, 5-44.

Deposit insurance and bank failure resolution: Cross-country evidence, with L. Laeven, in Deposit Insurance around the World - Issues of Design and Implementation, A. Demirguc-Kunt, E. Kane, and L. Laeven (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008, pp. 149-178.

Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending, with A. Demirguc-Kunt and R.Levine" Journal of Monetary Economics 53, November 2006, pp. 2131-63.

The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution Concepts and Country Studies, in Who Pays for Bank Insolvency?, D.G. Mayes and A. Luiksila (eds.), Basingstoke: Palgrave-McMillan, 2004.

Deposit Insurance as Private Club: The Case of Germany, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 42, October 2002, pp. 701-719.